We review the economics literature which deals with identifying bias, or taste for discrimination, using statistical evidence. A uni…ed model is developed which encompasses several di¤erent strategies which have been studied in the literature. We also discuss certain more theoretical questions concerning the proper objective of discrimination law.
Introduction
The term "racial pro…ling"typically refers to discretionary enforcement practices which have a disparate impact by race. However, the term is also used more broadly, in reference to a number of situations in which one or more treators chooses whom to treat among a number of agents with heterogeneous characteristics. This broader acception of the term "pro…ling" is sometimes applied to disparities in medical care, in lending, in jury selection, etc., as well as disparities by gender and other characteristics. The term racial pro…ling is derogatory-it is usually taken to denote a reprehensible, possibly illegal practice. Yet among the public there is no consensus about how broadly it should be applied, because people have di¤erent views about what exactly should be (or is) illegal. At one extreme, some people tend to think that most disparities in outcomes should be deemed illegal. The other extreme is the view that only disparities re ‡ecting an invidious bias, or intentional discrimination, should be illegal.
The law is fairly clear-at least in its broad principles. Discrimination law in the United States generally does not prohibit disparities in outcomes (referred to, in legal parlance, as disparate impact), as long as they do not re ‡ect an intent to discriminate. The expression "intentional discrimination"has a speci…c legal meaning: it is taken to mean that the treator engaged in disparate treatment "because of,"not merely "in spite of,"its adverse e¤ects upon an identi…able group. A mere awareness of the consequences of an otherwise neutral policy does not su¢ ce. 279 (1979) . There are two nuances to this statement. First, there is the question of allocating the burden of proof. In some areas of the law (employment law is one of them), once the plainti¤ shows disparate impact, it is up to the defendant The practical di¢ culty with translating this broad legal principle into practice is that it is often not obvious how intentional discrimination could be distinguished from other (legitimate) sources of disparity. Typically, when attempting to infer discrimination from statistical data, a key di¢ culty arises from "missing variables:" among the legitimate sources of disparate impact are productive characteristics of the treated, which are potentially correlated with race, but may not be observed by the researcher. Because statistical data are unlikely to record all productive characteristics of the treated, this potential problem is pervasive. Thus many view the task of proving intentional discrimination using statistical data as exceedingly di¢ cult, perhaps impossible absent evidence of explicitly discriminatory statements (typically verbal) by the defendant.
A segment of the economics literature is concerned precisely with identifying intentional discrimination from statistical data in the presence of confounding factors such as missing variables. 2 In this paper we provide an overview of a number of papers which deal with this subject. In order to give a coherent account of this part of the literature, we develop a uni…ed model which encompasses many instances of racial pro…ling which have been studied in the literature. Writing down the general model will force us to be precise about what features are common to this literature, and what di¤erences require the use of various identi…cation strategies. 3 As the model is specialized in Sections 4 through 7, we brie ‡y discuss some key papers in the literature. In Section 8 we step back from the question of identi…cation and to show that the disparities do not re ‡ect intentional discrimination. Second, the law permits regulations issued by government agencies to forbid disparate impact. 2 Pair-audit studies are designed precisely to side-step this issue. Their strategy is to design "experiments" where the researcher eliminates unobserved characteristics by using tester pairs that are identical in all productive characteristics and di¤er only by race. We will not review the literature on pair-audit studies; Heckman and Siegelman (1993) provide a critical assessment of this methodology. 3 Ayres (2002) and Todd (2006) also discuss identi…cation of bias in racial-pro…ling environments.
turn to more theoretical questions concerning the proper objective of discrimination law.
A model
In this section we sketch a model that underlies several of the identi…cation results in the literature. Let's start with the actors. There are two types of actors in the model; the potential discriminators, and those potentially discriminated against. We shall refer to the …rst group as the treators, and to the second group as the treated.
The treated are modeled as a mass of atomistic agents, distinguishable in the eyes of a treator by their characteristics g 2 G: For example, if the treator is a lender who can observe the race, education, and credit score of the applicant, then each g represents a vector of the applicant's race, education and credit score. Race is a salient characteristic in our analysis, and for expositional ease we shall assume that there are only two races, African-American and white. The set of possible characteristics observed by the treators is denoted by G:
A treator chooses an action a g 0 for each group, subject to the vector fa g g 2 A: The actions represent the extent of treatment that is applied to group g: The set A represents the set of possible actions the treator can undertake. In the case of lending, for instance, a g could represent how many members of group g receive a loan, and the set A would capture the constraint that the total amount lent to all groups cannot exceeds the lender's budget.
The treator "legitimately" cares about achieving an objective which is represented by the function (a g ; a g ; g) : 4 While the legitimate objective may depend on race, it only does so because of legitimate (i.e., productive) reasons. Note that the objective also depends on the scalar a g : This scalar captures the aggregate behavior of other treators beyond the one we are studying. In the case of the lender, the legitimate objective could be maximizing the pro…ts from lending to group g, and a g could represent the amount of credit extended by the credit sector as a whole to applicants in group g: We shall assume henceforth that (a g ; g)
is decreasing in a g :
5
For notational ease, we shall proceed under the assumption that g's and a g 's are continuous real variables, that the G's are measurable, and that (a g ; a g ; g) is a continuous function of its arguments. 6 The treator's objective function potentially comingles the "legitimate"part (a g ; a g ; g) with illegitimate bias. We model this bias as a multiplicative group-speci…c coe¢ cient (g), and
assume that the treator chooses the vector fa g g in order to optimize the function
The coe¢ cient (g) 0 captures a psychic cost, of key interest but unobserved, which leads A question arises when the treator's objective is not race-neutral not because of any treator's taste for discrimination, but because of a taste for discrimination by third parties. For example, a store owner hiring clerks may decline to hire minorities owing to the customers'discriminatory taste. In this case, the law holds that the store owner should ignore the customer's discriminatory tastes. Another question arises when the legitimate objective, even though race-neutral, leads to ine¢ cient disparities by race. We will return to this point in Section 8. 5 Note that we do not explicitly endow the treated with actions. The possible response of the treated to the treatment is embodied in the function (a g ; a g ; g) : 6 These assumptions allow us to write integrals, but nothing in the analysis that follows rests on these assumptions. In particular, the analysis would carry through if the g's were elements of a …nite set with no cardinal or ordinal structure. 7 Throughout the paper we use the convention that, when the domain of integration is not speci…ed, it is intended to be the full set of characteristics G: the treator to privilege the interest of certain subgroups of the population. In the case of lending, for example, a low (g) means that the lender discounts the ‡ow of pro…ts coming from group g; which makes the lender less inclined to lend to that group. In the literature the parameter (g) is often referred to as "taste for discrimination." 8 We use (g) to capture the legal concept of intentional discrimination.
We do not assume that we are able to observe the full set of characteristics g observed by the treator. Rather, we assume that we are able to observe whether a treated agent's characteristics belong to a partition (with generic element G) of the set G of all possible characteristics. Suppose, for instance, that credit applicants di¤er along just two dimensions:
their race A or W , and the inherent value H or L of their business idea. In this case the full set of characteristics observed by the lender is
Suppose we are only able to tell the race of successful credit applicants, but not the value of their business idea. The partition we observe is then composed of two elements
For each successful applicant we are able to tell whether s/he belongs to G 1 or G 2 ; but not his/her full set of characteristics. Thus, in the language of econometric theory, we may have missing variables. This happens when the partition we observe is very coarse. We shall denote by R the set that includes all groups with race equal to R 2 fA; W g ; so that in the previous example we would write G 1 = A and G 2 = W: We will assume that, at a minimum, we are able to distinguish the race of the 8 See Becker (1973) . An alternative way of introducing a taste for discrimination is through an additive parameter. In this alternative formulation, the agent maximizes something like R [ (a g ; g) (g)] a g dg: This is the formulation adopted by Knowles et al. (2001) and Anwar and Fang (2006) , for example. The analysis we present would go through with minor adaptations in the additive setup. The main advantage of the multiplicative model we use is that it makes it easy to subsume the set of environments studied in Section 7. treated in our sample. Formally, then our partition is always at least as …ne as the partition fA; W g :
The observability restrictions we take on are compactly summarized as follows. We assume that, for all elements G of a given partition of G; we are able to observe
where a g denotes the optimal (for the treator) choice of actions. In the lending example, the …rst quantity represents total pro…tability from loans to group G; the second quantity represents total money lent to group G: In the following sections we shall see how far we can go by observing only (2) , and how other observables (typically, sources of exogenous variation) can aid in identifying bias.
As mentioned above, the fact that we do not observe each g separately captures the fact that we have missing variables. We will not need to assume that the missing variables are independent of the variables we do observe (race, in the example). In a similar vein, we make no use of any cardinal or order structure on the g's or even the G's for estimation.
Thus, for example, we have no information (and thus use none) about the g's or the G's for which a g = 0: In this sense, the identi…cation strategies we will cover work di¤erently from the conventional econometric selection models. 9 An implication of our observability restriction is that we may have no information whatever 9 See, e.g., Amemiya (1985) . about treated agents for which a g = 0: In the case of lending, for example, this means that any information we have only re ‡ects applicants who receive some (positive) amount of credit.
This assumption may be too restrictive; in some cases, records are kept about those who are not treated (lending may actually be one of those cases). In other circumstances, however, this assumption is appropriate. In enforcement discrimination, for example, information about those who are not subjected to enforcement is often not available. 10 Our goal is to identify the function (g) :
11 Naturally, our ability to do so will partly depend on how coarse our partition is vis-a-vis the variability in the function ( ). Our identi…cation task is easier if we place some restriction on (g) : The literature typically proceeds under the assumption that
that is, that bias is constant across all characteristics (observable and not) except for race.
We too shall make this assumption.
An implicit assumption is that all our observations come from solving the optimization problem studied in this section. In some cases, some of the observations may actually be generated by a di¤erent process, a fact which poses additional challenges for identi…cation.
12 10 For instance, data concerning the New York Police Department's practice to "stop and frisk"pedestrians do not include information on pedestrians who were not stopped (see Gelman et al. 2007) . 11 Up to a linear transformation, of course. 12 Hernandez-Murillo and Knowles (2004) develop statistical methods to deal with a vehicular search dataset in which an unknown fraction of the observations are generated by a non-discretionary search process (for example, the search was executed incident to an arrest and thus prescribed by police regulations).
Examples
The model we discussed …ts, at a broad level, a number of important applications. Below, we list some of them.
Lending discrimination. The treator is a single lender, the treated are the population of credit applicants to that lender. a g (resp., a g ) represents the amount of credit extended by that lender (resp., by the entire credit sector) to applicants with characteristics g:
The constraint fa g g 2 A captures the lender's budget constraint-the total amount of funds available to the lender is …xed. The function (a g ; a g ; g) captures the expected pro…t when a loan of size a g is extended to a member of group g: Imposing the special structure (a g ; a g ; g) = (a g ; g) a g captures competitive behavior on the lender's part.
The assumption that (a g ; g) is decreasing in a g means that the expected pro…t on the marginal dollar lent decreases as the sectors directs more credit opportunities to member g applicants. (This could be, for example, because interest rates charged in equilibrium decrease).
Hiring discrimination. The treator is a school principal, the treated are applicants for a given number of teaching positions. a g represents the number of applicants with characteristics g who are hired. The constraint fa g g 2 A captures the fact that only as many teachers can be hired as the number of open positions. Suppose that wages are …xed exogenously to be the same for all g (for example by a rigid sectoral contract), and an unbiased principal maximizes the probability of hiring an e¤ective teacher. Then (a g ; a g ; g) = (g) a g , where (g) captures the probability that an applicant of group g is an e¤ective teacher.
Health care discrimination. The treator is a primary physician, the treated are her patients. a g represents the number of patients with a collection of symptoms characteristics g who are referred to a specialist for further evaluation. Suppose an unbiased physician refers for further testing those patients whose symptoms indicate a su¢ ciently high probability of having a disease. Then (a g ; a g ; g) = (g) a g , where (g) captures the probability that a patient of group g has the disease.
Enforcement discrimination. The treator is a single police o¢ cer, the treated are the citizens under his jurisdiction. a g (resp., a g ) represents the number of citizens with characteristics g who are searched by that o¢ cer (resp., by the entire police force).
The constraint fa g g 2 A captures the fact that a police o¢ cer can only search so many citizens in a day. Suppose the police o¢ cer maximizes the probability of …nding contraband. If a single police o¢ cer has negligible aggregate impact, we may assume that (a g ; a g ; g) = (a g ; g) a g , where (a g ; g) represents the probability of …nding contraband when searching a member of group g: The dependence on a g captures the idea that, if the entire police force focusses on group g, then members of that group become less likely to carry contraband. We will also consider the speci…cation in which the treator is the entire police force, and so (a g ; a g ; g) = (a g ; g) : In this case, (a g ; g) could capture the aggregate crime committed by members of group g:
Selective prosecution. The treator is a prosecutor, the treated are the cases under his jurisdiction. a g represents the number of accused with characteristics g who are pros-ecuted by that o¢ cer. The constraint fa g g 2 A captures the fact that the prosecutor can only prosecute a given number of cases. Suppose an unbiased prosecutor maximizes the probability of conviction. Then (a g ; a g ; g) = (g) a g , where (g) captures the probability of conviction when prosecuting a member of group g:
Sentencing discrimination. The treator is a judge, the treated are defendants who are before him. a g represents the fraction of defendants of group g who are convicted by that judge. Suppose an unbiased judge maximizes the probability of convicting the guilty. Then (a g ; a g ; g) = (g) a g , where (g) captures the probability that a defendant of group g is guilty.
4 Identi…cation without variation
Basic model: partial equilibrium
In the basic version of the model we focus attention on only one treator. In addition, we impose two restrictions on our general model. First, we assume that the objective function is linear in the treator's action:
The fact that a g enters the objective function multiplicatively embodies the idea that the treator's behavior has a negligible impact on the environment. We take a g as an exogenous parameter; this assumption will be relaxed in the next section.
Second, we assume that the treator's action set is given by
This constraint can be seen as an aggregate resource constraint, where a g represents the amount of resources devoted to group g and C represents the total amount of resources available to the treator. A key feature of this constraint is that there is perfect substitutability between e¤orts devoted to di¤erent groups. Both assumptions will be relaxed, at some cost, in later sections.
Given our assumptions, the treator's optimization problem is
The solution a g to this constrained maximization problem maximizes the Lagrangean
subject to the constraint that each a g 0: If an optimal a g is strictly positive and …nite, then maximization of the Lagrangean implies that
If the optimal a g is zero then
0. In either case we may write
Evaluate at G and at G 0 and form the ratio to get
For all G W and G
0
A we have, in light of assumption (3),
The fact that equation (8) must hold for all G W and G
A is a rather strong testable implication of this model. Setting G = W and G 0 = A we have
13 To take the ratio we assume that R G a g dg and R G 0 a g dg are positive, that is, that the treator searches both G and G 0 : We will return to this point in the next section.
The left-hand side, if di¤erent from 1, represent (relative) bias. The right-hand side is the ratio of the average pro…tability in the two racial groups. The idea that bias can be detected by comparing the pro…tability across subgroups is usually attributed to Gary Becker, who observed that a …rm which discriminates against minority employees uses labor inputs less e¢ ciently, and therefore should have lower pro…ts, than a non-discriminating …rm.
Proposition 1 Suppose a treator solves problem (5). Then
is equal to the average pro…tability in race W divided by average pro…tability in race A:
A very useful feature of this proposition is that it is possible to ascertain bias even in the presence of "productive"unobservables which may be correlated with race.
Extension: General equilibrium
A prediction of this model is that only the groups with the highest value of (g) (a g ; g)
are treated. If the functions (g) and (a g ; g) were chosen arbitrarily, we would typically expect just one group to attain the highest value of (g) (a g ; g), and therefore only one group to be treated. 14 This would be an unrealistic implication of the model. 15 But in fact this implication need not follow if the value of (a g ; g) is determined in equilibrium through the dependence on a g : Positing a dependence of (a g ; g) on a g is reasonable in applications in which the treated agents react to the behavior of a mass of treators whose actions generate the aggregate action a g . For example, in enforcement situations citizens in group g may 14 More precisely, this unrealistic implication would hold provided that all resources can be absorbed by treating the "highest scoring" group. 15 And, in addition, either the numerator or the denominator of equation (7) would be ill-de…ned.
decrease their rate of carrying contraband if they expect to be the focus of enforcement by the entire police department. To make this argument formal, we now sketch a bare-bones model that incorporates the response of the treated to treatment.
By assumption, the impact of a single treator on a g is nil, so we need to model a mass of treators, the actions of which give rise to the aggregate action a g . We consider a rather stark model in which there is a mass of treators which are identical in all respects to the treator described in Section 4.1. The problem is now a general equilibrium problem involving a mass of treators. The equilibrium is described by the following set of conditions:
The optimization problem is the same as that in Section 4.1 except for the last line. The last line is an accounting equation specifying that the parameter a g is the aggregate of the individual actions a g of all treators. Note that this de…nition of equilibrium requires that all treators take the same actions. 16 This general equilibrium model di¤ers from the previous one in that now the value of the function (a g ; g) is determined as part of the equilibrium. If the response of (a g ; g) to variations in a g is sharp enough, then we can expect many groups to yield exactly the same value of (g) (a g ; g) in equilibrium. The intuition for this equalization is that, if only one group was treated in equilibrium, then its members would respond by decreasing its : If this response is sharp enough, the pro…tability of that group would fall below that of other groups. But then it is optimal to treat those groups too. Hence in equilibrium more than one group would be treated.
Formally, a su¢ cient condition for more than one group to be treated is that for every g there exists a g 0 such that
A su¢ cient condition for all groups to be treated is an Inada condition of the form
Regardless of whether these conditions hold, Proposition 1 carries over to this setting. Therefore, the test to detect bias is unchanged when we go to the general equilibrium model.
The general equilibrium version of the model ties up two loose ends. First, as mentioned above, it explains why we should not be surprised that several classes can be treated simultaneously in equilibrium. Second, it pins down the intensity of treatment across treated groups, which would be indeterminate in the partial equilibrium model. In the general equilibrium formulation, although individual treators are indi¤erent between any allocation of their treatment across the groups that receive positive treatment in equilibrium, the aggregate level a g is uniquely determined in equilibrium. Indeed, in equilibrium the vector a g is set so as to equalize (g) a g ; g across all groups that receive positive treatment in equilib-rium. Thus, in equilibrium disparities in treatment a g across groups or classes of groups can arise even if (A) = (W ) ; provided that ( ; g) 6 = ( ; g 0 ) for some g A; g 0 W: In other words, di¤erences in the intensity of treatment partially re ‡ect (observable or unobservable) di¤erences in the reaction of the treated to treatment. This is why information about the intensity of treatment across groups is generally not su¢ cient to identify bias.
A more general version of this "general equilibrium" setting is the one where we allow the treated to respond not only by reducing their crime, but also by disguising themselves as members of other groups. In the case of the police, for example, if members of group g are policed very intensely, they have the option not only of decreasing their crime rate, but also of disguising themselves as members of group g 0 : In this setup, the return from treating group g would depend not only on the intensity with which group g is treated, but also on the intensity with which other groups are treated. If we denote by [a g ] the vector of treatment intensities for all groups other than g; we can write
The main point is that Proposition 1 carries over to this setting.
The identi…cation strategy described in this section was used in Knowles et. al. (2001) and Persico and Todd (2006) . In both cases, it was applied to vehicular searches, 17 and the function (a g ; g) was taken to be the probability of …nding contraband. In this environment the right-hand side of (9) corresponds to the fraction of searched motorists of group G who are found with contraband-the so-called "hit rates."Both papers found hit rates to be very 17 On Maryland's I-95 in one case, in Wichita, Kan. in the other.
similar not only between African American and whites, but also along by a number of other characteristics (sex, time of day, age of the driver, etc.). 18 This equalization seems unlikely to happen randomly. A possible conclusion, therefore, is that motorists are responsive to search intensity as assumed in this model and that police o¢ cers are not biased against African Americans.
Ravina (2007) and Pope and Snydor (2008) study a decentralized lending market in which lenders set interest rates to compete for loans of …xed size. The intuition behind the theoretical setup developed by Pope and Snydor (2008) can be easily understood by studying a slightly di¤erent game, one in which lenders allocate money a g to borrowers of type g subject to a budget constraint. The expected pro…t from one dollar lent to group g is given by the function (a g ; g). As the aggregate amount a g lent to that group increases, (a g ; g)
is assumed to decrease re ‡ecting a decrease in the equilibrium interest rate. This formulation casts Pope and Snydor (2008) directly within the framework of this section. Pope and Snydor …nd that loans to African Americans produce a lower rate of return than loans to whites. This …nding is consistent with some kind of market discrimination against whites, or with a failure by lenders to fully take into account what race signals about the probability of repayment.
5 Identi…cation using variation in the observability of race Suppose we had access to exogenous variation in the observability of race. Suppose, that
is, that we could observe the treator's behavior when he can observe race and when he cannot. Intuitively, the color-blind setup might seem the ultimate benchmark against which to compare ordinary (and thus possibly biased) behavior. This intuition is based on the notion that any disparities that arise when race becomes observable are due to bias. This intuition is valid if the treator observes no other variable other than race that can improve the targeting of the treatment, but is not valid otherwise. The next example shows that an unbiased police o¢ cer looking for contraband will stop more African Americans when race is not observable than when it is. This di¤erence, by construction, cannot be ascribed to racial bias on the part of the o¢ cer. Rather, the di¤erence arises from the speci…c pattern of correlation between race and some other variable observed by the o¢ cer. African Americans, the color-blind o¢ cer stops 50% African Americans, and in both cases the o¢ cer is unbiased.
The example demonstrates that, as race becomes observable, changes in treatment between the two races are driven by the correlation between race and other characteristics observed by the police (car color, in the example). Therefore, bias cannot be identi…ed solely from changes in treatment that arise as race becomes observable.
Despite this theoretical point, in some cases variation in the observability of race may help shed light on the presence (or absence) of bias. Grogger and Ridgeway (2006) study how the fraction of black drivers stopped by the Oakland police varies between day-time and nighttime. Presumably, the race of the driver is more di¢ cult to observe at night, yet essentially no variation is detected in the fraction of black drivers stopped. I …nd the absence of variation rather illuminating.
We can adapt the same logic to situations such as blind v. non-blind musical auditions.
Example 3 An orchestra conductor auditions 120 men and 120 women musicians for a total of 100 jobs. As these are tenured jobs, he wishes to select musician with the greatest future musical ability. He can observe the quality of their performance in the audition today If the conductor can see the musician's gender, then he will hire all 100 men. If the conductor cannot see gender, his best bet is to select based on audition performance and he will hire 50 men and 50 women. Therefore, blind auditions lead to an increased percentage of females hired even though the conductor is unbiased.
Goldin and Rouse (2000) …nd that female musicians are more likely to be hired when the audition is blind. Although Example 3 cautions against using this …nding to draw inference about bias, that example relies on the di¤erence between performance in the audition and future musical ability (the outcome of interest). When these two are closely aligned, as it is plausible they might be in practice, then the evidence presented by Goldin and Rouse becomes highly suggestive of bias in the sense modeled in this paper.
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6 The inframarginality problem
The term "inframarginality" refers to a problem that clouds identi…cation. To facilitate exposition, let's assume that (a g ; a g ; g) = (g) a g . We will relax this assumption in Section 6.1. 19 The examples presented here are somewhat similar in ‡avor to Heckman's critique of pair audit studies (see Heckman 1998), even though the second does not explicitly rely on the presence of productive variables used by the treated and unobserved by the researcher. 20 In addition, from a legal viewpoint the mere practice of using gender as a predictor of a musicians' musical abilities conditional on audition performance is probably illegal per se. This gives rise to what Ayres (2002) refers to as the "subgroup-validity problem."
We conceptualize the inframarginality problem by adding the following constraint to problem (5):
The interpretation is that no group can be treated with intensity exceeding I (g) : This constraint captures, albeit in a stylized way, situations in which there are frictions in the reallocation of resources across groups-in this case, sharp diseconomies of scale when the group g is treated with intensity exceeding I (g) : We de…ne marginal and inframarginal groups as follows.
De…nition 4 A marginal group is a group for which the optimal treatment satis…es 0 < a g < I (g) : An inframarginal group is a group for which a g = I (g) :
In what applied situations is constraint (10) likely to bind for some group? Consider for example a physician who with probability a g prescribes further testing to patients with symptoms g: In this case I (g) = 1 for all g; because a probability cannot exceed 1. The physician may choose to prescribe further testing for all patients who show su¢ ciently serious symptoms. For these groups of patients, the probability of being referred is 1, so the constraint (10) binds and they represents the inframarginal groups.
The Lagrangean for this more-constrained problem is the following:
subject to a g 0 for all g: If an optimal a g is strictly positive and …nite, then maximization of the Lagrangean implies that [ (g) (g) 0 1 (g)] is maximal and equal to zero. The presence of the term 1 (g) creates a problem for the identi…cation strategy. The analogue of equation (7) now involves terms such as R 1 (g) dg; which means that the ratio of average pro…tabilities (the right hand side of (9)) no longer directly re ‡ects the di¤erence in the 's.
To pinpoint the source of the problem, note that if we could observe (g) for two marginal groups, one in each race, then we would be able to identify bias. Indeed, for a marginal group we have simultaneously (g) (g) 0 1 (g) = 0 and (11)
The …rst equality re ‡ects the fact that a g > 0, the second re ‡ects the fact that a g < I (g) :
Provided we have two marginal groups g A m and g W m , in race A and W respectively, we could use (11) and (12) to get
Thus, if hypothetically we could observe the average pro…tabilities for both marginal groups, then we could read the bias o¤ of the ratio in pro…tabilities. But, as mentioned above, we do not directly observe the pro…tability for the marginal groups because we cannot recognize marginal groups. Rather, we observe an aggregate of pro…tabilities R G (g) a g dg over a
broader set of groups which may include g m ; a marginal group. The confounding groups g 6 = g m are called "inframarginal," and thus the identi…cation problem is referred to as "inframarginality problem." 21 
Response from motorists alleviates the inframarginality problem
The inframarginality problem arises when at the optimal solution the constraint a g I (g)
is binding for at least one g: Obviously, the constraint is less likely to bind when I (g) is
large. But what other factors can alleviate the inframarginality problem? A notable such factor is the response of treated to the treatment. In this section we show that a general equilibrium model like the one presented in Section 4.2 indeed can attenuate the impact of the inframarginality problem. The general equilibrium problem is described by the following set of conditions:
a g I (g) for all g:
By assumption, the function (a g ; g) is decreasing in a g : In the case of police searches, for example, if group g is searched more intensely, that group will reduce its illegal activities.
Intuitively, we should expect this property to alleviate the inframarginality problem. This is because the inframarginality problem arises from the treator's desire to treat group g with intensity greater than I (g) : When that group is allowed to respond, as it is in this formulation of the problem, the pro…tability of treating group g will decrease, which will decrease the incentives for the treator to focus on group g in the …rst place. A polar case that brings this force into sharp relief is the case where
This assumption means that treating group g becomes unpro…table before the intensity of its treatment hits the constraint I (g) : If this assumption holds, then in equilibrium the inframarginality constraint will not bind and the inframarginality problem does not arise.
Identi…cation in the presence of inframarginality: Comparing the performance of two treators
Absent sources of exogenous variation in C, the literature has been able to deal with the identi…cation problem only partially. The identi…cation strategy has been to compare the performance of two di¤erent treators, labelled 1 and 2. From these di¤erences in performance, it has been shown that it is sometimes possible to identify which of the two treators is more biased against members of race R. Formally, the identi…cation strategy sometimes allows to reject the hypothesis that
The identi…cation strategy does not, however, tell us whether i (A) = i (W ) exceeds 1, so we cannot exclude that both treators are biased in favor of whites, or possibly against whites.
Suppose we had two treators, i = 1; 2; with possibly di¤erent i 's and C i 's, both of whom are treating the same population. 22 Assume that for R = A; W each treator had a marginal group g 22 This is a very important assumption which sometimes needs to be defended in practical applications. For example, in some studies the treatment is a search (or a ticket), and the population is the motorists stopped by an o¢ cer. Clearly, in this case the assumption that two di¤erent o¢ cers stop the same population of cars needs to be defended.
This equation excludes the possibility that 
Proposition 5 Suppose two treators solve problem (5) with treator-speci…c C i and i ( ) ;
and with the additional inframarginality constraint (10). Suppose treator 1 treats more whites than treator 2 and, at the same time, treator 1 treats fewer African-Americans than treator 2. Then
.
It is worth remarking that this proposition holds regardless of the values of the C i 's. Of course, if the C i 's are very di¤erent then we may be unlikely to observe the constellation of treatment intensities described in Proposition 5, and so we may not be able to rule out hypothesis (15) . 
Since H R ( ) is monotone increasing in , equation (16) and with the additional inframarginality constraint (10) . Suppose treator 1 has a lower average pro…tability on whites than treator 2 and, at the same time, treator 1 has a higher average pro…tability on African-Americans than treator 2. Then
This proposition has been used by Anwar and Fang (2006) in the context of vehicular searches by the Florida Highway Patrol. 24 They …nd that hit rates on whites are higher than hit rates on African Americans, which in the framework of Section 4 would denote racial animus against African Americans. Yet they also …nd evidence suggesting that the appropriate model is closer to the one presented in Section 6. Therefore, they look to apply Proposition 6. They …nd that the hit rates vary by race of the o¢ cer, and yet the hit rates of white and black o¢ cers do not line up as posited in Proposition 6. Therefore, they argue that it is not possible to conclude that black and white o¢ cers are ranked in terms of bias. Based on more years of data from the same agency, Ilic (2008) 24 Rowe (2008) derives a related test and applies it to ticketing probabilities.
Identi…cation with non-atomistic treators
Until now we have dealt with atomistic treators, whose impact on aggregate quantities was assumed to be negligible. As such, a treator could devote as many resources as needed to group g without a¤ecting its behavior, and so the treator's payo¤ function was linear in resources. When treators are large they may have an impact on aggregate quantities, and nonlinearities are likely to arise in the treator's objective function. In that case, the identi…cation is highly sensitive to the precise objective of the treator. In what follows we shall concentrate on the case of a monopolistic treator, 25 so we may write without loss of generality (a g ; a g ; g) = (a g ; g) :
We assume that (a g ; g) is concave in a g : This apparently conventional assumption will be discussed in Section 8.
Let us dispose …rst of a particularly simple case. In certain environments, the legitimate objective of the treator might be to equalize an objective function across categories. For example, a judge may be required to set bail levels for di¤erent defendants so as to achieve a given "appropriate"(race-independent) level of probability of ‡ight. In these environments, the treator's legitimate objective is to set a g so as to achieve
We can think of a biased treator in this setting as one whose value comes to depend on 25 We do not deal with the case of oligopolistic treators.
g: This conceptualization is formally analogous to condition (6) because the value of the "legitimate" portion of the objective function at the optimum is proportional to a factor that captures bias. Therefore, the identi…cation strategy developed in Section 4 applies to this case. 26 Ayres and Waldfogel (1994) apply that strategy to look for racial bias in the judge's decision of the level at which to set bail. 27 Although they do not directly observe the probability of ‡ight (corresponding to a g ; g ), they observe the fee charged by bail bondsmen to defendants who borrow to pay the bond. The assumption is that the size of the fee re ‡ects ‡ight probability. 28 They …nd that, compared to whites, African Americans are charged lower fees, which suggests a lower probability of ‡ight and therefore "too large" a bond.
29
A more challenging setup, and a fairly natural one, is that in which the treator solves problem
(1) subject to constraints. We shall proceed under the assumption that the constraint is given by (4), just as in Section 4.1. Even so, the identi…cation problem is qualitatively di¤erent from the one solved in that section, as we shall see. An example of our problem is that of a police chief allocating manpower across neighborhoods g with a legitimate goal of minimizing aggregate crime across all neighborhoods. Since it is reasonable to assume that the chief's actions a¤ect crime rates in each neighborhood, the treator's objective function is likely 26 We also assume implicitly that there is no inframarginality constraint. 27 Ayres and Waldfogel (1994) must be credited for recognizing that the identi…cation strategy presented in Section 4 is robust to unobservables. 28 One might object to the assumption that the function transforming the bond fee into a ‡ight probability is the same for blacks and whites. If blacks are poorer than whites, a lower bond fee might su¢ ce to achieve a given ‡ight probability. 29 As well, they …nd that those charged with more severe o¤enses pay lower rates, which within the context of the model suggests that judges set bail so as to achieve a lower probability of ‡ight for more severe o¤enses.
non-linear. The programming problem is now
In the police chief's problem, the function (a g ; g) represents the negative of the crime rate in neighborhood g; and the coe¢ cient (g) represents the weight given to neighborhood g's crime in the chief's objective function, so that a low (g) represents bias against neighborhood g: The associated Lagrangean is
subject to a g 0 for all g: The …rst order conditions are
Suppose we have exogenous variation in resources C, and that we can compute how a mar-ginal change in resources a¤ects total crime in race R. That change is given by
where the second equality follows from 18. We can therefore write
The RHS represents the variation in total pro…tability detected in race R as a fraction of the change in treatment devoted to race R: Both terms can be recovered empirically. 30 It follows that
Thus we have shown the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose a treators solves problem (17) . Suppose we can observe the change in average pro…tability and a change in treatment due to exogenous variation in resources.
is equal to the ratio of the changes in pro…tability in race W over race A; times the ratio of the changes in treatment in race A over race W: 30 If we think of the hit rate as an average e¤ect, this is a marginal e¤ect.
Of course, exogenous variation in C is not always available. Dominitz and Knowles (2006) provide parametric conditions under which no variation in C is required. Under their conditions, the success rates in the right-hand side of equation (9) provide information about bias.
8 Social optimality, equal treatment, and the absence of bias
In this section we move from identi…cation to a more philosophical question. Within the framework analyzed in the previous question, what should be the goal of discrimination law?
The uncontroversial core goal of discrimination law is that the law (i) should aim at rooting out bias, (ii) with minimum disturbance to the economy; where (iii) bias is de…ned as disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. 31 Why does this goal seem so reasonable?
In part because our intuition is that removing "unwarranted"disparities moves us closer to the …rst best. More speci…cally, our intuition suggests the following statements should hold rather widely, and thus provide an "e¢ ciency rationale" for discrimination law as it exists today.
a Bias (in the sense of taste for discrimination) is operationally equivalent to disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. 31 A subset of those who care about these issues, both in the public and in academia, would also be favorable to disturbing the economy, provided that the disturbance favors protected classes (minorities, women, etc.). This attitude is controversial, however, particularly among the non-protected classes.
b Disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals interferes with welfare maximization. each composed of 100 identical citizens. Every citizen will commit a crime unless he is policed with probability at least 49%. The police, acting as a monopolist, can police exactly 50 citizens and seeks to minimize total crime (regardless of the race of the criminal). If both racial groups are treated equally then each citizen has a probability 25% of being policed, and so all citizens will commit a crime. If the police focusses all its resources on one group, the W for example, then each member in that group will be policed with probability 50%, just enough to deter crime. Thus no citizen in group W, and all citizens in group A, will 32 One such reason is that in many practical applications the treator is an agent in a principal-agent relationship, and so the treator's "legitimate"objective function is designed at least in part to deal with the agent's incentive problem. We will return to this point later in this section. 33 We choose to ignore henceforth one element of the social welfare function-the pleasure that the discriminators receive from discriminating. This omission does not drive our results.
commit a crime. Under the non-discriminatory strategy the crime rate is 100%, under the discriminatory one it is 50%. If we take crime minimization to be the social objective, 34 then the discriminatory strategy is welfare-superior to equal treatment.
The salient feature of this example is that the pro…t functions (a g ; g), which in this case coincide with the welfare function (crime rate) are not concave in a g (intensity of policing).
It is this failure of concavity that gives rise to "optimal disparate treatment."This example demonstrates that even an unbiased social planner facing identical groups may want to treat these groups di¤erently. Looking beyond this perfectly symmetric example, the more general point is that even if two groups are slightly di¤erent, the optimal solution may feature wildly disparate treatment. 35 In practice, then, this observation casts doubt on the expectation that conditioning on productivity should explain di¤erences in treatment. That is not to say that race-based disparities are the unavoidable side-e¤ect of optimization.
36
But Example 8 does show that the equivalence between the propositions "similarly situated individuals are treated di¤erently"and "intent to discriminate"(in economic parlance, taste for discrimination), is not necessarily warranted. 37 34 We might want the welfare function to also account for the cost to the citizens of being policed. To the extent that the cost is the same for citizens of both groups, the aggregate cost of being policed is a constant in the welfare function and can therefore be ignored. 35 Conversely, remedial policies resulting in a large impact on the allocation of treatment across groups may actually have a small e¤ect on pro…tability. 36 The previous example is somewhat arti…cial if we take the perspective that equal treatment by race is a value per se. In that case, one would presumably be able to segment the population into non-race based groups (say, by the initial of their last name), and implement the optimal policy based on those groups. In this way, we might be able to implement the optimal policy while reducing or eliminating the correlation between disparities in treatment and protected categories (race, gender, age, etc.). 37 However, while at the optimal solutions the disparities may be correlated with a protected category, there are second-best allocations that in which the disparities need not be. Thus, if our goal is to achieve close-to-optimal and not-disparate by group allocations, the corrective action (legal, for example) had better look like a quota instead of relying on corrective action that alters the perceived productivity of individual groups. Quotas, of course, would be equivalent to segmenting treatment along arbitrary (but not protected) lines.
Having established that bias, in the sense of "taste for discrimination,"cannot be con ‡ated with "disparate treatment," let us now turn to an example in which eliminating bias is not welfare-improving. In this example points c. and d. do not hold. The ideas in this example are developed in Persico (2002) , Alexeev and Leitzel (2004) , and Persico and Todd (2005) .
Example 9 (c, d) Consider two groups (A and W), each composed of 100 citizens, each of whom will carry drugs unless the probability of being searched is su¢ ciently high. Citizens within each group are heterogeneous in their propensity to carry drugs, and so are deterred by di¤erent probabilities of being searched. In group W, exactly one citizen is deterred for every additional search applied to group W, whereas in group A it takes two additional searches to deter a citizen. There are 90 police o¢ cers who can each search exactly 1 citizen. Each o¢ cer chooses which group to search from in order to maximize the probability of a successful search. Suppose the police are unbiased. Then in equilibrium the police have to be indi¤erent between searching either group, and so the crime rate has to be equal in the two groups.
This requires that 100 a W = 100 (a A =2) ; which means that group A is searched twice as much as group W . In contrast, crime minimization requires directing all searches on group W; because it provides the highest marginal return to treatment. Making the police o¢ cers biased against W would move the equilibrium closer to the crime-minimizing allocation.
In this example points c. and d. do not hold: making the o¢ cers biased against whites would improve welfare (reduce the crime rate), and interfering with unbiased treators (for example, forcing the unbiased police to search more whites) would improve welfare. The characteristic of the example is that, while the crime minimization (welfare maximization) problem is
(we take (a g ; g) to be the crime rate), each police o¢ cer maximizes successful searches,
The two problems give rise to di¤erent …rst order conditions (given by equations (18) and (6), respectively), so it should be no surprise that the aggregate behavior of individual police o¢ cers is not welfare maximizing in this example. Still, the example highlights a broader issue: the problem of incentivizing individual treators (the police o¢ cers) to make a costly treatment (e¤ort in searching motorists) whose impact on the aggregate outcome of interest (crime rate) cannot be measured reliably (in this case because it is small). In such instances, it is necessary to come up with incentive schemes which reward individual e¤ort (rewarding successful searches), and those schemes need not be collinear with the social welfare function.
Whenever these incentive problems arise we are in a second-best world, and so there is little reason to think that points c. and d. apply. How important are such frictions in practice?
Economists tend to think that incentive problems such as this are ubiquitous.
In circumstances where a-d may fail, the shared consensus for the core goals of discrimination law cannot rest on a-d. When c and d fail, for instance, bias can increase social welfare.
What, then, is the basis for the core principles of discrimination law? The considerations presented above challenge us, I think, to dig deeper into this question.
38 38 My reading of Harcourt (2004) is that he recognizes these concerns, and he weaves them into a proposed evidentiary procedure to evaluate when using race as a factor in discretionary searches by law enforcement would be constitutionally acceptable. According to Harcourt, the police should be challenged if any disparity
Open questions
On the front of police enforcement, a central concern in the broaded …eld of racial pro…ling, an important task would be to greatly extend the set of jurisdictions that are the subject of analysis. A di¢ cult, but very interesting question would be to understand whether the models analyzed in this paper are applicable to other jurisdictions, and if not, what kind of alternative models need to be developed. Painting a broad picture of the phenomenon of racial disparities in enforcement is important because existing studies are limited in their scope. In this connection, it should be noted that enforcement agencies themselves frequently collect and analyze their own data. Therefore, in theory this task could be accomplished by the enforcement agencies themselves, if they were able to deal with identi…cation and other data issues that necessarily arise in any practical situation. More realistically, the fact that enforcement agencies collect enforcement data means that the data exist in machine form and can, at least in principle, be requested by researchers via Freedom of Information Act requests.
On the identi…cation front, a natural next step is to develop models of multi-stage treatment.
In many contexts, the same treator treats an agent in several stages. In the labor context, for example, the employer …rst selects applicants and then retains them, promotes them, and pays them wages. Altonji and Pierret (2001) develop a multi-stage model of employment, and their results indicate that employers do not condition their wage on race at the …rst seby race is observed. If the police is unable to come up with other factors that eliminate the statistical e¤ect of race on the search decision, then the police would then have to show: (i) that race is predictive of crime; and (ii) that the percentage of minorities among the criminals who happen to be searched be no greater than the percentage of minorities within the criminal population at large; and (iii) that the use of race helps decrease aggregate crime. lection stage (wage at …rst hiring), suggesting that employers do not behave as predicted by the statistical discrimination model of Arrow (1973) .
39 Barnes (2005) develops a statistical selection model dealing with vehicular stop and search data. She is able to provide information about some observable characteristics of the vehicle stopped and not searched (in our language, she is able to provide information about the g's for which treatment is equal to zero). By means of the statistical model she then infers the probability of carrying contraband of those g's who are not searched. 40 In general, we would expect that the modeling the interaction between multiple stages of decision-making would pose new challenges-and opportunities-for identi…cation.
A largely unexplored question is that of identi…cation when the objective function is not separable within or across classes, so that treating two agents, one in group g and the other in group g 0 ; does not give rise to the sum of (g) + (g 0 ) but to a more complicated function i (g; g 0 ) which is possibly treator-speci…c. This seems like a challenging problem, yet it is an important one because arguably many employers have speci…c production processes and cultures etc. that do not …t the additive, employer-independent speci…cation.
A question of some theoretical interest is whether the bias is conscious or unconscious. This 39 See also Coate and Loury (1993) . 40 Roughly speaking, the statistical methodology is based on the assumption that, after appropriately contolling for observables, the hit rates on those non searched are approximately equal to those of the searched. Since in her data hit rates are largely constant across races, the implication is that it would be possible to search some more whites without a decrease in hit rates. Within the framework put forth in the present paper, there are two potential issues with this procedure. First, even if motorists do not react to policing, and thus (a g ; g) = (g) ; if the police is made to search new b g's (more whites), it will necessarily be the case that the new groups searched have a return (b g) which is no higher, and possibly lower, than those g's who were being searched already. Second, if motorists do react to policing, and thus (a g ; g) does depend on a g , then increasing a g decreases (a g ; g) : For both reasons, we would expected that inducing the police to search more whites would bring down the average success rate on whites, particularly on those not previously searched. Despite these observations, Barnes (2005) adds value because it focusses on integrating the stop and search decisions and tackling the associated selection problems. question appears to be challenging, both at an interpretive level and at an identi…cation level.
With an intellectual leap, we might phrase this question in our model as follows: is there bias in the ( ) functions (conscious bias), or are the treators misperceiving the expected pro…t function ( ) ; due perhaps to a failure to properly update (unconscious bias)? 41 On a related point, there is growing evidence suggesting that rapid decisions are more subject to (possibly) bias than more deliberate decision processes. As far as I know, discrimination law does not di¤erentiate between "conscious" and "unconscious" intent to discriminate, which is somewhat interesting given the central role that intentionality and "mens rea"play in the legal system. It would be interesting to introduce these considerations into our analysis.
The analysis in the previous sections, including Section 8, suggests that the bias that discrimination law attempts to correct manifests itself di¤erently in di¤erent environments.
Speci…c disparities may indicate bias in certain environments but not in others. This suggests that evidentiary rules should be carefully tailored to speci…c areas of the law. For example, in the case of police enforcement, comparing the results from Sections 4 and 7
suggests that we should look for evidence of bias in di¤erent ways depending on whether we are concerned with the bias of the individual police o¢ cer(s) in the allocation of their discretionary searches, or whether we are concerned with bias in the allocation of aggregate resources by a police chief. Of course, evidentiary rules do di¤er across areas in US law. It would be interesting to assess the degree to which this variation can be explained as solving the kind of identi…cation problems described in this paper.
On a more theoretical level, the analysis in Section 8 raises some normative question about the current goal of discrimination law-namely, to eliminate bias. As we have seen in Example 9, bias can sometimes help achieve social welfare due to a second-best logic. What should the law prescribe in these cases? Should we introduce race-based incentive schemes for police o¢ cers, for example, in order to improve social welfare? The natural reaction is to discount such instances as theoretical curiosities and therefore not worry about them. Of course, one might take the opposite viewpoint and use this argument to provide an e¢ ciency rationale for non-neutral policies such as a¢ rmative action. 42 The fact of the matter is that the adjudicator in a court of law is ill-positioned to assess questions of social optimality.
This "ignorance argument"could be taken as a (not overly strong) argument in favor of the current goal of discrimination law. 43 
Conclusions
Discrimination is alleged along many lines-race, gender, age, disability, etc. Typically, the allegations arise in conjunction with disparities in outcomes. A disparity in outcomes, however, is not per se illegal, as it may re ‡ect a correlation with (possibly unobserved) productive characteristics. What is illegal is intent to discriminate. Therefore it is important, both from a legal standpoint and from an intellectual standpoint, to be able to distinguish productivity-related (and thus justi…able) disparities from those re ‡ecting discriminatory 42 Of course, even in a second-best world, a¢ rmative action need not necessarily be welfare-improving. On this point, see Coate and Loury (1993) . 43 Manski (2006) deals with the problem of a non-atomistic (indeed, a monopolistic) treator who seeks to maximize a pro…t function (a g ; g) with limited information about the shape of (a g ; g) :
intent. Making this distinction using statistical data is generally seen as di¢ cult, partly because discriminatory intent is viewed as a state of mind and therefore di¢ cult to ascertain.
In this paper we laid out a model in which to study the identi…cation of a bias parameter.
The model organizes several results that have been obtained in the literature in various applied contexts. The …rst message is that no single identi…cation strategy works in every situation. Depending on the speci…c features of the problem, and on the variation that is available, di¤erent statistics represent valid evidence of bias. The second message is that identifying bias is not hopeless, and in fact many of the methods we have discussed have been successfully applied to real world data. Therefore, it is hoped that the body of work reviewed in this article will be of practical use.
